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NOTES

The Foreign Commerce Clause and the
Market Participant Exemption
ABSTRACT

In this Note, the author argues that, despite the strictures of the Foreign Commerce Clause, under an expansive conception of the market
participantexemption, states should be able to place restrictions on the
export of state-owned or state-nurtured natural resources. In light of
the current trade imbalance between Japan and the United States and
by way of example, the author discussesJapan's importation of United
States naturalresources and the competing interests that arguefor and
against its continuance.Japan's economic growth, appetitefor natural
resources, and lack of adequate regardfor environmental consequences
is well documented. Economists and political scientists have posited that
the inherent structural imcompatabilities between the United States and
Japanese approaches to internationaltrade strongly suggest that Japan's trade surplus with the United States will not decrease. This trade
imbalance has created economic and political pressures to export
United States naturalresources to Japan.At the state level, however, a
combination of economic and environmental motives have driven some
states to consider legislation that would prohibit the export of natural
resources.
The author examines the foreign prong of the Commerce Clause,
which prohibits state legislation restricting the export of natural resources. Recent Commerce Clause decisions have indicated that a theoretical basis exists for validating state legislation which restricts the export of state-owned or state-nurtured natural resources. The author
discusses Maine v. Taylor, which signals a growingjudicial solicitude
for state regulation of interstate commerce that promotes environmental
considerations. Applied to the Foreign Commerce Clause, Maine v.
Taylor and the line of market participantexemption cases suggest that
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states validly could enact environmentally motivated restrictions on the

initial distribution of state-owned natural resources. The author argues, in the case of state-owned natural resources, that for reasons of
public policy the market participant exemption should be expansively
interpreted to include not only state-owned natural resources, but also
those natural resources that pervasive state regulation and management facilitate or nurture.
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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, Japan has assumed a growing predominance in world
trade. Much of Japan's international trade has been aimed at acquiring
the natural resources that are not indigenous to, or are becoming prohibitively more scarce in, resource-poor Japan.' Unfortunately, Japan's in-

ternational environmental impact has been the subject of widespread
condemnation.2 The Japanese economy's ravenous appetite for natural
resources has deprived much of the Third World of indigenous raw
materials and has created long-term environmental damage with little
corresponding long-term benefit.'
The seemingly perpetual growth of its trade surplus with the United
1. See JAPAN (Time-Life Books ed., 1985), 14, 117 (Japan imports oil, iron ore,
lead and copper ore, 'bauxite, wool, cotton, and lumber); see also EDWIN 0. REISCHAUER, THE JAPANESE TODAY: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY 23-24 (1988); T. MORRIS-SUZUKI ET AL., JAPANESE CAPITALISM SINCE 1945, at 167-69 (T. Morris-Suzuki &

T. Seiyama eds., 1989).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 19-43.
3.

See infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.

1992]

FOREIGN COMMERCE CLAUSE

States is further evidence of Japan's increasing strength in international
trade. Aided by informal, but nonetheless protectionist, trade barriers entrenched in Japanese custom, Japan only sparingly imports finished
goods from the United States.' As the world supply of raw materials
diminishes, Japan increasingly covets the United States relatively abundant natural resources. The chronic trade deficit creates market forces
that will increase the pressure on the United States to sell its remaining
natural resources. The United States federal government's rigid adherence to a free-trade stance toward Japan, despite Japan's covert, but
structurally inherent, protectionism exacerbates the situation.5 Using the
strict scrutiny standard of the foreign branch of the United States Constitution's Commerce Clause, courts universally have invalidated state attempts to protect natural resources, or at least to ensure that their disposition benefits state citizens. 6 The market participant exemption,
however, provides a possible loophole whereby states could enact legislation to prevent foreign acquisition of state-owned natural resources. Currently, courts would invalidate this state legislation as protectionist, absent an explicit endorsement by Congress.' Nevertheless, the theoretical
underpinnings of the Foreign Commerce Clause are sufficiently diverse
that contemporary legal interpretation can adjust to environmental
necessity.
Following a brief introduction, Section II discusses the economic, political, and environmental background of the Note. Section II-A focuses
on Japan's economic success in world trade. Section II-B sets forth the
global environmental impact of Japan's trade policies and practices. Section II-C illustrates the United States persistent and chronic trade deficit
with Japan. Section II-D examines state efforts to limit the acquisition
of state-owned natural resources by foreign entities for environmental
and economic reasons. Section III addresses the question whether such
state efforts can survive Commerce Clause scrutiny. Section III-A examines the values underlying the Commerce Clause and posits that they are
sufficiently diverse as not to absolutely prohibit all state restrictions on
foreign acquisition of state-owned natural resources. Section III-B discusses the Commerce Clause as it relates to the regulation of natural
resources. Section III-C examines relevant Foreign Commerce Clause

4. Karl G. van Wolferen, The Japan Problem, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Winter 1986/87,
at 288, 297.
5. Fujiwara Sadao, Foreign Trade, Investment and IndustrialImperialism in PostwarJapan, in MORRIS-SuzuKI ET AL., supra note 1, at 196-98.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 164-93.
7. See, e.g., South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 100 (1984).
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cases. Section IV proposes that the market participant exemption to the
Commerce Clause also should apply to the foreign branch of the Commerce Clause. Section V concludes that Commerce Clause jurisprudence
could accommodate environmentally motivated state legislation that restricts the international export of state-owned natural resources under
the market participation exemption.
II.
A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Japanese Economy in World Trade

Japan's post-war ascendancy in international trade is a remarkable
economic success story. Japan has become one of the world's leading economic powers, second only to the United States.8
Statistics reflect the phenomenal growth of Japan's export economy.
Every year since 1964, with only two exceptions, Japan has maintained
a trade surplus with the United States.' Since 1980, the United States
cumulative net deficit in trade with Japan is 460 billion dollars.' 0 Japan's economic growth is attributable largely to the exportation of finished goods." Conversely, Japan is reluctant to import finished goods.' 2
Japan, however, must import one commodity-natural resources.' 3
Japan is a small, densely-populated island-state, severely lacking in
natural resources.'" Its production-centered economy requires large
quantities of natural resources. Evidence of this need lies in Japan's consumption of raw materials purchased from other states. 5 For example,
8. See Alan S. Miller, Three Reports on Japan and the Global Environment,
July/Aug. 1989, at 25, 25 (reviewing ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY, GOVERNMENT
OF JAPAN, WHITE PAPER ON THE ENVIRONMENT IN JAPAN 1988: JAPAN'S CONTRIBUENV'T,

TION TOWARD THE CONSERVATION OF THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT; AD Hoc GROUP
ON GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS, JAPAN'S ACTIVITIES To COPE WITH
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS: JAPAN'S CONTRIBUTION TOWARD A BETTER
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT; ENVIRONMENT AGENCY EXPERT PANEL ON GLOBAL WARMING, INTERIM REPORT ON GLOBAL WARMING).

9.

Michael W. Punke, Comment, StructuralImpediments to United States-Japanese

Trade: The Collision of Culture and Law, 23 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 55, 56-57 (1990).
10. State of the U.S. Economy, with Emphasis on the U.S. Trade Deficit withJapan:
Hearingof the Senate Banking Committee, Federal News Service, Jan. 15, 1992, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Allleg File (statement of Sen. Riegle).
11. See Sadao, supra note 5, at 167, 176-78, 186-88, 193-94.
12. See van Wolferen, supra note 4, at 297; James Fallows, Japan:Playing by Different Rules, THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 1987, at 22, 26, 28.
13. Fallows, supra note 12, at 26.
14. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
15. Id.; see also Miller, supra note 8, at 26.
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Japan imports more than fifty percent of the world's supply of broadleaved logs.18 Additionally, Japan receives more than one-quarter of the
world's imports of roundwood and coal.17 Japan also consumes more
than one-third of the worldwide shrimp harvest.1 '
B. Japan's InternationalEnvironmental Impact

Given Japan's economic strength and voracious appetite for the
world's natural resources, Japan's international environmental behavior
is of paramount importance. 9 Unfortunately, Japan's impact on the
world ecology has been perceived largely as negative. According to Edwin Reischauer, the former United States ambassador to Japan: "the
Japanese, for all their love of nature, have done as much as any people
to defile it."2 Worldwide, Japan has attained the reputation of being
virtual "eco-outlaws." 2 Many -environmental organizations believe that
Japan's economic expansion is responsible, in large part, for the worldwide degradation of the marine environment, the destruction of tropical
forests, the decrease in biological diversity, and the squandering of stocks
of natural resources.22 For example, despite international efforts to curb
the ivory trade, the precipitous decline in the world's elephant population has been partially attributed to Japan's demand for ivory hankos, or
name seals.23 Japan also has resisted international efforts to prevent the
extinction of endangered species.24 Additionally, Japan refused to adopt

16.
17.
18.

19.
20.
21.
at 68;
22.

Miller, supra note 8, at 26.
Id.
Id.

See id. at 25.
Id. (citation omitted).
See Sharon Begley et al., The World's Eco-Outlaw?, NEWSWEEK, May 1, 1989,
see also Miller, supra note 8, at 25.
See Miller, supra note 8, at 25; see also Begley, supra note 21, at 68; Neil

Gross, ChargingJapan with Crimes Against the Earth, Bus. WK., Oct. 9, 1989, at 108.
But see Jim Impoco, Japan'sLate Greening, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Mar. 16,
1992, at 61 (describing Japan's recent change in attitude toward environmental issues).
23. Bill Dietrich, Our Troubled Earth-Japan,SEATTLE TimEs, Nov. 13, 1990, at
F2. In Asia, approximately two-thirds of imported ivory tusks are made into name seals.
Id. at F5. Name seals are "ivory stamps used to endorse checks or access bank accounts.
The name seals have legal recognition in Japan, China and Korea that written signatures lack." Id.; see also Michael J. Glennon, Has InternationalLaw Failed the Elephant?, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1990).
24. Japan ratified the Convention on the International Trade Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) in 1980. See JapanJeopardizingInt'l Wildlife Treaty,
Says LaPointe, Japan Economic Newswire, Apr. 26, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Omni File. Initially, Japan requested reservations to 36 species. Id. As of 1989,
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laws regulating domestic trade in international endangered species until
1987.25 Despite international recognition of the necessity to curb whaling
to preserve the remaining whale populations, Japan is one of only two
states that continues to conduct large-scale whaling operations.26 Moreover, Japan is one of the most vociferous and outspoken defenders of
7

whaling.1

Japan's effect upon the world's tropical rain forests has been particularly disastrous. More than forty percent of Japan's wood imports origi-

Japan had reduced this number to 12 reservations. See Begley, supra note 21, at 68.
"Reservations allow a signatory to the convention to disregard the endangered status
accepted by other governments." Miller, supra note 8, at 26. Thus, Japan continues to

trade in endangered species of whales, lizards, and musk deer.
Japan has been criticized frequently as "one of the world's leading illicit traffickers in
endangered wildlife." See Impoco, supra note 22, at 61; see also Rudy Abramson, Wild

Debate Expected on Rare Animals, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1992, at 5 ("Japan's past
whaling policies, drift-net fishing and massive imports of endangered sea turtles have
made it an object of environmentalists' scorn."). According to Traffic, a group that
monitors international trade in endangered species, in 1990 Japan had more reservations
to CITES for commercial purposes than any other, state. See Jonathan Thatcher, Asia's

EndangeredSpecies Headfor Cage, Table or Fashion,Reuter Library Report, Apr. 19,
1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. More recently, however, this
trafficking is shifting from Japan toward other states in Asia, including Taiwan, South
Korea, China, and Thailand. See Colin Nickerson, The Asian Nightmare: A Hotbedfor
Illegal Trade in Endangered Species, GAZETTE (Montreal), Mar. 21, 1992, at L6.
25. Miller, supra note 8, at 26.
26. Virginia A. Curry, Comment, Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean
Society: The Great Whales Become Casualties of the Trade Wars, 4 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 277, 279 (1986). A moratorium on commercial whaling went into effect in 1985.
The moratorium was passed by the International Whaling Committee (IWC), set up in
1946 by whaling nations to manage whaling. The IWC currently allows Japan to kill
330 minke whales a year for scientific purposes. See Makiko Shinohara, Scientists Clash
Over Whaling, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 27, 1992, at 10. Japan asserts that "it
has stopped commercial hunts and conducts only scientific whaling." Begley, supra note
21, at 68. Some scientists and environmental organizations, however, have questioned
whether scientific research is being conducted during these Japanese whaling expedi-

tions. See Shinohara, supra, at 10; see also Greenpeace Condemns Japanese 'Scientific
Charade' on Whales, Agence France Presse, Feb. 9, 1992, available idi LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Omni File. See generally Anthony D'Amato & Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales:
Their Emerging Right to Life, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 21, 32-48 (describing the formation
and development of the IWC and the moratorium on whaling), 54-56 (description of
Japan's "scientific research activities" related to whaling). The moratorium on whaling

was renewed by the IWS in 1990. Id. at 48.
27. Id. at 277. "Whaling in Japan is perceived as a matter of national pride and not
an ecological issue, even among many environmentalists." Miller, supra note 8, at 27.
"For the Japanese people, the whale is not only a food source, but also a basis of culture." D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 26, at 57 (citation omitted).
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nate from those nations that contain the planet's rapidly disappearing
tropical rain forests. 28 The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) has released a
report severely criticizing Japan for its role in the global destruction of
the rain forests.2" The WWF Report claims that over the past thirty

years, Japan's corporations have systematically devastated the tropical
forests of Southeast Asia.aa In Malaysia, for example, tropical forest logging projects have prompted protests against Japanese timber
corporations. 31
In 1989, Japan imported 6.7 billion board feet of unfinished logs.32
Japan requires a high volume of timber imports to feed an insatiable
hunger for wood products. 3 This wood consumption seems to be culturally endemic. Japan often describes itself as a "culture of wood" in
which a market exists for any conceivable wooden product.34 Notably,
Japanese chopstick production alone annually consumes the equivalent
of ten million two-by-four lumber pieces eight feet in length.3 5 Japan
consumes large amounts of disposable paper products in the form of
elaborate packaging, newspapers, and adult comic books." Consequently, Japan's per capita paper consumption is twice as large as the
37
European average.
Japan's negative ecological impact merely reflects the primacy of eco-

28. Miller, supra note 8, at 26.
29. See David Swinbanks, Japan No Help to Rain Forests, 338 NATURE 606, 606
(1989).
30. See id. Attributing this destruction to "a combination of Japan's trade and foreign aid policy, a booming economy and wasteful consumption of wood," the WWF
Report recommends that Japan establish binding environmental impact assessments, set
up a committee to guide Japan's rain forest conservation efforts, and reduce its excessive
consumption of tropical timber. Id. As of March 1992, Japan still has not required
environmental impact statements. See Gross, supra note 22, at 108.
31. Miller, supra note 8, at 27. In the Malaysian state of Sarawak, "more than 100
members of the Penan Tribe have been arrested in protests against the logging." Gross,

supra note 22, at 109.
32. See Terry McDermott, At Loggerheads: The "Marriage" of Japan and the
Northwest Pits Environmental Issues Against Tough Economics, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug.
19, 1990, at Jl (Magazine).
33. See id at J5 ("if a wooden product exists there is a market for it in Japan"); see
also Dietrich, supra note 23, at F3 (describing how Japanese imports of wood have
increased approximately 30% from 1965, while Japanese production of domestic wood
has decreased almost 50% during the same period, in part because it is cheaper to buy
wood from the Pacific Northwest and import it).
34. McDermott, supra note 32, at J5; see also Dietrich, supra note 23, at F3.
35. Dietrich, supra note 23, at F3.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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nomic development over long-term environmental health in the Japanese
government's hierarchy of values.38 The Japanese Environmental
Agency is weak compared to the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI) and other government agencies. 3" The MITI and the
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries largely control Japan's
Overseas Development Assistance Program.40 Japan's foreign aid policy
is instrumental in advancing its economic interests, regardless of the environmental consequences. 4' Typically, Japan grants foreign aid in order

to fund infrastructure development in Third World nations that benefits
Japanese corporations by facilitating resource extraction. 42 These

38. See generally Miller, supra note 8, at 26 (describing as "unusual" a Japanese
government report which expresses concern regarding the adverse effect of economic
growth on the global ecosystem, because "economic growth is virtually a Japanese religion"); Swinbanks, supra note 29, at 606 (noting that Japan's Overseas Development
Assistance Program has funded environmentally destructive projects). In Japan, private
environmental organizations have only a slight influence upon public policy. Their access
to information and the judiciary is severely limited. Miller, supra note 8, at 28.
Environmental awareness among the Japanese people is extraordinarily low. Japan
was ranked lowest in overall environmental concern and awareness in a 1989 survey
conducted by the United Nations Environment Program. See Impoco, supra note 22, at

61; Jonathan Porritt, Open Space: No Campaigning For the Environment
Please-We'reJapanese, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Oct. 26, 1991, at 103. This is reflected in
the low membership levels in Japanese environmental organizations. For example, it has
been estimated that the total number of people involved in environmental organizations
in Japan is 250,000 maximum, whereas the total number in the United Kingdom is 4
million. Id. at 103. Greenpeace Japan, Friends of the Earth, and World Wild Fund for
Nature all encounter difficulty in Japan due to apathy, lack of money, and low membership. See Veldin Kattoula, Apathy, Ignorance FrustratesActivists, NIKKEI WKLY., Oct.
12, 1991, at 19. Some have attributed low involvement to "the social stigma attached to
membership of such environmental groups," resulting in alienation or even harming employment prospects. Id.; see also Porritt, supra, at 103 ("Japanese environmentalists are
still considered by the establishment to be 'subversive forces.' ").
39. Miller, supra note 8, at 28. "The Environment Agency has little power to enforce the few environmental laws that exist and in essence is no more than an unsuccessful mediator between environmentalists and the powerful larger ministries," according to
one environmentalist. Kattoula, supra note 38, at 19.
40. Swinbanks, supra note 29, at 606. Japan's overseas development assistance
budget is the world's largest at 11,000 million dollars. Id. at 26.
41. See Miller, supra note 8, at 26. Japan reportedly intends to disburse $50 billion
in grants and loans by 1992. See Gross, supra note 22, at 108.
42. See Miller, supra note 8, at 26 (describing Japan's approach to financial aid as
"commercially oriented," and citing a report which notes that "much of Japan's aid goes
to infrastructure projects such as power plants and mines, which have major environmental impacts"). Critics are concerned about Japan's "potential to wreak havoc with the
ecologies of recipient countries," because Japan's aid projects focus on short-term gains,
and fail to consider the impact on the environment. See Gross, supra note 22, at 108.
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projects have impacted negatively on the ecology of such nations. 43
C.

The Chronic United States Trade Deficit

While Japan's economic star has waxed, the United States economic
star has waned. The United States trade deficit with Japan stood at
43.44 billion dollars in 1991.44 The United States global trade deficit
ballooned from 31 billion dollars in 1980 to 170 billion in 1987." 5 In
1980, the United States had a 27 billion dollar surplus in the international trade of manufactured goods.46 By 1987, this surplus dropped to
138 billion dollars.47 United States efforts to reduce its burgeoning trade
deficit have been uniformly unsuccessful. Economists and other observers
of United States-Japan relations posit that a trade imbalance between
Japan and the United States is inevitable given certain structural aspects
of the respective economies and societies.48
Japan espouses free trade, but practices protectionism. Imports accounted for only ten percent of Japan's gross national product (GNP) in
1987, and most imports were raw materials, which Japan must import.49
Japan does not generally employ formal trade tariffs.5 ° Instead, Japan
implements informal barriers known as nontariff barriers, which are
equally restrictive. 51 Despite the complete absence of formal trade barriers, a 1987 World Bank study found that the industrialized world's most

Funds are often used to "strip natural resources" from the recipient states. Critics also

claim that Japanese foreign aid programs "fail to consider environmental impacts and
emphasize the short term exploitation of resources rather than the creation of sustainable
economic growth." Id.
43. See Swinbanks, supra note 29, at 606 (Japanese development efforts "have destroyed rain forests and damaged the health and economic welfare of local populations in

several South-East Asian states). In the Amazon, Japan has been criticized for its willingness to finance a major highway in order to spur resource exploitation in a previously
undeveloped area. See Miller, supra note 8, at 27; Begley, supra note 21, at 68.
44. Keith Bradsher, December Trade Gap Widened, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1992, at
Dl.
45. Punke, supra note 9, at 56.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Fallows, supra note 12, at 24.
49. Id. at 28.
50. See Punke, supra note 9, at 57-58. Many cultural nontariff barriers are unaffected by the GATT, which leaves Contracting Parties free to develop nontariff barriers
as a response to domestic economic interests. Id. at 65.
51. See Fallows, supra note 12, at 26 for examples of Japanese barriers to trade; see
also Punke, supra note 9, at 58 (describing nontariff barriers to trade as "the primary
impediment to imported goods").
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heavily protected market is Japan. 52 The Structural Impediments Initiative revealed "informal structural arrangements that help shield the Japanese market against foreign participation. '53 The deep entrenchment of

these informal trade barriers in Japanese cultural patterns5 4 may enhance their effectiveness.
United States trade policy with Japan exacerbates this situation. Despite systematic behavior indicating that Japan will not voluntarily market reciprocally,' the federal government continues to insist that free
trade is always in the best interest of the United States. In his 1990
Economic Report to Congress, President George Bush reiterated his belief in restriction-free foreign investment in the United States." The
President's Council of Economic Advisers has expressed the belief that
limiting foreign investment "would weaken the [United States] economy."' 57 From 1980 to 1988, Japanese investment in the United States
increased by 1,036 percent.58 Despite United States insistence on free
trade, throughout the 1980s, Japan "openly restricted imports, subsidized exports, and became the world's richest per capita industrial
nation." 59
Recently, a number of economists and analysts, including James Fallows, Karl van Wolferen, and Pat Choate, have examined the nature of
the chronic trade disparity between the United States and Japan."°

52, Punke, supra note 9, at 57.
53. Karl van Wolferen, The Japan Problem Revisited, 69
(1990).

FOREIGN AFF.

42, 44

54. See Punke, supra note 9, at 55.
55. Fallows, supra note 12, at 29 (commenting that "[t]hreats not backed up by
action annoy the Japanese, make America look weak and nervous, and leave the bothersome trade patterns unchanged."). See also T. Morris-Suzuki and t. Seiyama eds., supra
note 1,at 172. In the post-war period, Japan did not attempt to liberalize trade until, in
1959, Ambassador MacArthur "pressed strong demands for the liberalization of trade
and foreign exchanges, .. ." Id. at 172. ". . . the highly vertical nature of Japan's trade
structure is a major source of friction." "As far as Japan is concerned, it is unlikely that

trade problems could be resolved without some rather fundamental structural changes."
Id. at 197. "History has demonstrated that Japan will not open its market unless the
United States demands that trade barriers be eliminated." U.S.-Japan StructuralImpediments Talks: Hearing of the InternationalTrade Subcommittee of the Senate Finance
Committee, Cong., Sess. - (1992) (statement of Senator Max Baucus (DMont.)), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
56. John S. McClenahen, The Buying of America: What's Left?, INDUSTRY WK.,
June 4, 1990, at 62, 66.
57. Id. at 66.
58. Id. at 62-63.
59. PAT CHOATE, AGENTS OF INFLUENCE 24 (1990).
60.

See, e.g., Fallows, supra note 12, at 22-32; van Wolferen, supra note 53, at 42-
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These commentators share the belief that, barring the unlikely change in
the status quo, the functional imperatives of the two economies will ensure that the economic interaction between Japan and the United States
will result in a United States trade deficit and Japanese economic
dominance."'
Fallows argues that the Japanese and United States economies are
grounded in different and contradictory philosophies.62 The United
States economy focuses on the consumer. The goal, therefore, is to produce more of everything at the lowest possible price.6 3 Consequently, the
United States encourages lower priced imports. In contrast, Japan's
economy is concerned primarily with producers and with increasing their
market share.6 4 Consumers are of secondary importance.6 5 Hence, Japan
resists the importation of finished products, even when they are less ex66
pensive, but, of necessity, encourages importation of raw materials.
Because Japan's primary motivation is "the non-capitalist desire to
preserve every Japanese person's place in the Japanese productive system,"6 7 Japan promotes exports regardless of market forces that would
recommend contrary action.6 8 Given Japan's desire to expand the international market share of its producers, it views protectionist cartels and
monopolies favorably because "they strengthen Japanese producers
against foreign competition." 9 When seeking to expand market share,
Japanese economic interests may refuse to act primarily on consideration
of price,7 contrary to what United States corporations do. Even when

the yen increases in value, the Japanese may refuse to import finished
goods.7 1 United States trade policy toward Japan is based on an ideal-

55; CHOATE, supra note 59, at 3-27.
61. See Fallows, supra note 12, at 24; van Wolferen, supra note 53, at 50; Choate,
supra note 59, at 3; infra notes 66-88 and accompanying text.
62. Fallows, supra note 12, at 24, 26.
63. Id. at 24.
64. Id. at 26, 28.
65. See id. at 24.
66. See id. at 26. "Japan, of all the great industrial nations, is buying far less manufactured goods than any other ...." U.S.-Japan StructuralImpediments Talks: Hearing

of the InternationalTrade Subcommittee of the Senate Finance Committee, -

Cong.,

Sess. (1992) (statement of Senate William V. Roth, Jr. (R-De)), available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
67. Id. at 24.
68. See id. at 26. The Japanese public subsidizes exports by paying the "world's
highest prices for consumer goods." van Wolferen, supra note 53, at 45.
69. Fallows, supra note 12, at 26.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 28 ("[i]f the yen rises high enough, Japan will finally be priced out of
-
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ized free trade model in which the participants always act on price and
the market provides equilibrium. 7 2 In Japan, by contrast, the market is
viewed as an "instrument[] to influence desired outcomes", but the market is "not allowed to determine the course of economic processes."17 3
Like Fallows, van Wolferen notes Japan's unwillingness to allow
market forces to dictate its economic fortunes.7 4 Unlike the United
States, Japanese society binds government bureaucracies and personal
networks together in noncompetitive relationships to promote the national economy. 5 The economic and political integration of Japanese society is a component of Japan's economic success relative to that of the
United States. 6 Mr. van Wolferen argues, therefore, that the trade deficit will continue to exist even if United States competitiveness improves.7 7 Japanese economic actors hold an inherently advantageous position because of their political protection that renders them immune to
bankruptcy.78 "[T]he international free trade system is undermined by
the very methods Japanese business interests use to help preserve the
79
advantages of their controlled domestic economy."1
The political economist Pat Choate maintains that the nature of Japanese investment presents a threat to United States economic and political
independence.80 The Japanese consciously seek to intertwine their economy with that of the United States to render the two nations' economic

interests indistinguishable, and to limit the independence of United
States economic action. Choate has noted:
Japan now wields so much political power in [the United States] that it
can, in effect, veto much legislation that it dislikes. It can ignore almost
any U.S. law or policy that it finds inconvenient....
Today, Japan plays a major role in shaping American public policy on
its export surplus. But if it were a society of economic men, it would have begun buying
its way out of the surplus long before now.").
72. Fallows, supra note 12, at 23-24.
73. van Wolferen, supra note 53, at 47.
74. See id. at 47.
75. See id. at 46-49.
76. See id. at 48.
77. See id. at 50.
78. See id. at 49-50.
79. Id. at 46.
80. See CHOATE, supra note 59, at xv. "By knowing about [political] decisions ahead
of its U.S. competitors, by using its network of well-connected insiders and lobbyists in
Washington, D.C., by unleashing its grass-roots political network, by shaping the coverage of economic issues by journalists, and by mobilizing its opinion leaders in universities
and think tanks, the Japanese are able to use their purchased political influence in
America as a critical element of their corporate and national strategies." Id. at xi.
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everything from tariff rates to federal support for . . . critical
technologies.8 1
According to Choate, Japan spends 400 million dollars annually to influence United States policies.8 2 Much of this influence is exerted through
former United States officials who, upon their departure from federal
government positions, became highly paid lobbyists for Japanese interests.83 Choate also believes that Japan consciously finances the growing
United States deficit in order to gain leverage over United States
policy.8 4
Choate argues that the Japanese manipulate their economic power in
a given area of trade through "government-sanctioned cartels" to gain
political power and further their overarching national trade goals.85
Typically, the Japanese will dominate a specific technology to gain control of that market.88 They then pursue a strategy of coordinated "predatory pricing" to effectively create a cartel of their activities. 87 The cartel
then exerts its market power attempting to "to take over other industries
'88
and to exert ever-greater political control."
D.

Individual State Efforts to Protect Natural Resources

In recent years, the United States relative abundance of natural resources increasingly has attracted Japanese attention.8 9 This trend is not
solely the result of the growing global scarcity of raw materials; it is a
market driven phenomenon as well. That is to say, in the acquisition of
natural resources the Japanese do act on price. 90 Natural resources con-

81. Id. at xx.
82. Id. at 39.
83. Id. at 38-39, 69, 71-72. The Japanese refer to this sort of money-tainted politics
as "structural corruption." In other words, so many advocates of Japan's position are
involved in decision-making that the ultimate outcome is structurally bound to be in
Japan's favor. Id. at xx.

84. Id. at 22-23. Choate also argues that the federal government has elevated the
importance of the United States-Japanese relationship to such a degree that it seemingly

has taken precedence over United States self-interest. See id. at 43.
85. Id. at 13. For an example of the impact of a Japanese cartel on the United States
television industry, see generally id. at 77-105.
86. See McClenahen, supra note 56, at 63.

87. Id. See also James D. Harman, Jr., Rico Meets Keiretsu: A Response to Predatory Transfer Pricing, 25 VAND. J. TRAN'L L. 3 (1992).
88. Id.
89.

See Sadao, supra note 5, at 191; McDermott, supra note 32, at J1 (noting that

"inwood products, [Japan's] trade deficit is as lopsided as are its surpluses in ...consumer electronics").

90. See, e.g., Dietrich, supra note 23, at F2 (noting that Japan imports two-thirds of
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stitute a large portion of Japanese imports."1 In response to the growing
United States merchandise trade deficit with Japan, the Reagan Administration devalued the dollar in 1985.92 Overall, the effect on trade of the
dollar's decline was negligible. Japanese producers refused to pass along

increased costs to United States consumers.9 " And Japanese consumers
expressed little interest in United States products regardless of the
price. 94 The devaluation of the dollar, however, did have one unexpected
effect. For Japanese buyers, the cost of United States timber decreased
dramatically, which allowed the Japanese to begin buying even more
timber from the United States Northwest. 5
In response to increasing importation of the United States diminishing
supplies of natural resources, some states within the United States have
enacted or considered various forms of quasi-protectionist legislation. 6
Since the federal government dogmatically maintains a free trade stance
toward international trade, state action is a possible alternative vehicle
for such legislation. For example, under the past six Presidents, official
United States policy has encouraged timber sales and wood use.,7 Environmental organizations have expressed the fear that, in foreign trade
negotiations, the federal government will sacrifice the states' inherent police power to protect the environment within their borders.9" State laws
restricting the export of natural resources are permissible under GATT
if enacted to protect the environment.99 Other motivations, such as the
preservation of jobs, would be impermissible.10 0

its wood supply, in part because it is more economically efficient than using Japanese
wood).
91. See Sadao, supra note 5, at 188; Fallows, supra note 12, at 28.
92. McDermott, supra note 32, at J4.

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See id. at J5. The net effect of this devaluation strategy was to double the price
of timber. Id. The Reagan Administration drove down the value of the dollar by selling
dollars and buying yen on international exchanges. In theory, devaluing the dollar should
prompt the Japanese to buy more United States goods. Devaluing the dollar makes each
dollar worth less yen. Therefore, Japanese products should become more expensive and
United States products become less expensive. Id. at J4.
96. For example, in late 1991, an organization known as Forests Forever Inc. proposed a ballot initiative for November 1992 to restrict exports of California logs. Virginia
Ellis, New Tree Protection Initiative Planned, L.A. TiMEs, Oct. 20, 1991, at A22.
97. McDermott, supra note 32, at J1, J4.
98. See Bruce Stokes, State Rules and World Business, 22 NAT'L J. 2630, 2630
(1990).
99, Id.
100. Id.
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Timber is not the only natural resource of the United States subject to
foreign consumption, and Japan is not the only foreign consumer. In
early 1990, Maine banned the sale of nonbiodegradable plastic beverage
containers to conserve decreasing landfill space. 10 1 The European producers of these containers protested." 2 The European Community, representing the container producers, charged Maine with implementing
nontariff, protectionist measures.10 3 As the United States becomes further
integrated in the global community, these clashes between individual
states within the United States and foreign interests will increase.
These protectionist-type statutes are grounded primarily in two motives. First, environmental concerns exist regarding the lasting ecological
damage caused by the market-driven extraction or processing of natural
resources." 4 California's failed Big Green 1989 ballot measure exemplified legislation primarily inspired by environmental concerns.10 5 A number of Big Green's provisions would have clashed with foreign interests.
For example, the proposed California exposure standards for certain
toxic substances were stricter than international standards.10 6 The "Forests Forever" ballot measure, which failed in the same election as the

"Big Green" ballot measure, would have restricted the export of California logs.' 7 Although Big Green failed, it underscored
growing environmental awareness and presaged future
The economic concern that local governments and
reap adequate benefits in exchange for the long-term
resources is the other motivating factor behind these

the United States
similar initiatives.
residents will not
depletion of their
protectionist stat-

101. Id. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 1868 (West Supp. 1991).
102. Stokes, supra note 98, at 2630 (referring specifically to "European firms that
sell vaccum-sealed beverages and license the packaging technology").
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 96, at A22; see also McDermott, supra note 32, at
JI.
105. See A Primer on the Propositions, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1990, at M4 (briefly
describing Proposition 128, also known as "Big Green"); Stokes, supra note 98, at 2630.
Big Green was eventually defeated by a margin of 63% to 37%, following an intense
media campaign by oil and chemical companies. See State and Local Ballot Questions,
Facts on File World News Digest, Nov. 9, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Omni File.
106. Stokes, supra note 98, at 2630.
107. A Primer on the Propositions,supra note 105, at M4 (briefly describing Proposition 130, also known as "Forests Forever"). Although Proposition 130 was defeated
in 1990, the Forests Forever alliance is preparing a new initiative entitled "The River,
Oak and Wildlife Protection Act," to ban timber clear-cutting and preserve wildlife
along waterways. See Chris Chrystal, Forests Forever Proposes New Timber Initiative,
UPI, Jan. 8, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
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utes.' 08 The social customs underlying the Japanese economy ensure that
Japanese raw material importers will patronize Japanese processors, regardless of price, over those processors located in the state where the raw
materials were extracted."0 9 When Japan imports raw natural resources,
therefore, the local economies from which the natural resources are taken
lose corresponding profits and jobs in the applicable processing industry.
Much of the debate over protectionist state legislation has focused specifically on the export of logs from the Pacific Northwest. While Japan
imports a wide array of natural resources, the quantity of its log importation is particularly astonishing. For example, Japan imported 6.7 billion board feet of logs in 1989.10 Most of this timber came from the
United States, with most of the unworked logs coming from the state of
Washington.""1 The majority of Japanese timber imports currently
originates in the Pacific Northwest. 1 2 Demand for wood leads Japan to
import logs from all over the world." 3 In one Japanese port that handles
only logs, one United States reporter, observed Douglas fir from Washington, Sitka Spruce from Alaska, Western Hemlock from the Olympic
Peninsula, Port Orford Cedar from Oregon, Kapok from Papua New

Guinea, Plantation Pine from Chile and New Zealand, Larch from Siberia, and Mahogany from Burma and Malaysian Lauan."14 Of all the
world's forests, however, Japan prefers old-growth timber from the Pacific Northwest because it so closely resembles native Japanese wood and
because it is relatively free from imperfections." 5 Ironically, logs from
the Pacific Northwest are so underpriced that it is less expensive for the
Japanese to import them than to harvest their own trees."'

108. See McDermott, supra note 32, at J6 for an example of Washington state mill
owners who complain that the Japanese will not buy finished timber from Washington
mills.
109. See, e.g., McDermott, supra note 32, at J6, J7 (noting that Japan purchases
logs, but not the same volume of lumber, in order to preserve Japanese lumber
mills-"extraordinary measures to protect a relative handful of jobs").
110. Id. at Jl.
111. Id. at J7; Dietrich, supra note 23, at F3.
112. See McDermott, supra note 32, at J1, J4, J7; Dietrich, supra note 23, at F3.
113. See Dietrich, supra note 23, at F3. Partially because of Japanese wood demands, every state in Southeast Asia, except Malaysia, has restricted log exports. Id.
Due to United States log export restrictions, Japanese buyers are beginning to look to
Chile and Russia "to ensure a continuous supply of raw material for their mills." MiniTrade Bill Provision Prompts Reduction in Private Log Exports, Bureau of National
Affairs International Trade Reporter, Dec. 5, 1990, at Vol. 7, No. 48, 1828.
114. McDermott, supra note 32, at J1.
115. Id. at J5.
116. See Dietrich, supra note 23, at F3; McDermott, supra note 32, at J5-J6. De-
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For the foregoing reasons, Japan prefers to import unworked logs for
processing in Japanese mills rather than to process the logs in United
States mills, a method which would be less expensive and more practical." This policy receives support in the form of unofficial Japanese
government policy against the importation of finished logs. 18 The impenetrable social bonds between Japanese timber importers and mill
owners reinforces this prohibition." 9 The ultimate goal is the preservation of Japan's 17,000 domestic timber mills and the attendant mill
jobs. 20 Motivated partially by the anticipated loss of United States jobs,
mill owners in the Pacific Northwest, along with the Department of
Commerce in the Pacific Northwest, have accused the Japanese of restricting imports of finished logs.' 2 '
In this atmosphere, mill owners and environmentalists have forged a
tenuous alliance.121 Environmental groups resist the manipulation of
their agendas for economic goals. They do not want to prevent, however,
state legislatures from using trade legislation benefiting mill owners in
order to achieve environmental ends.' 23 This fragile alliance set the stage
for the emergence of proposals to ban exports of timber from stateowned forests.' 24 Most old-growth forests are located on land owned by

spite this volume of imported logs, 45% of usable trees felled in Japanese forests are left
to rot on the ground hauling them to Japanese mills is more expensive than importing
logs from the United States. Dietrich, supra note 23, at F3. Japan also is motivated
environmentally to preserve their forests. While United States lumber corporations clear-

cut vast forest tracts to satisfy the Japanese demand for wood, the Japanese restrict clearcutting in their own forests to plots of 25 acres or less. Id. at F2.
117. See McDermott, supra note 32, at J6.
118. See id.
119. Id. at J6-J7.
120. Id. at J6. This situation is not the first instance of Japanese refusal to act on
price in order to preserve Japanese jobs. The Japanese government has pursued a similar protectionist policy in favor of Japanese rice farmers, despite the enormously lower
cost of rice grown in the United States. Id.
121. See id. at J6.
122. Id. at J8.
123. See Stokes, supra note 98, at 2630 (National Wildlife Federation representative
commenting "we also do not want to weaken a state's right to use trade measures for
environmental purposes.").
124. See McDermott, supra note 32, at J8. In June 1989, Oregon voters approved a
state constitutional amendment to ban log exports from state lands, by a margin of
90.4%. The amendment, however, would not take effect until it was approved by Congress. Peter Gillins, Voters Approve Ban on Log Exports by Big Margin, UPI, June 28,
1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. Similarly, in April 1989, Idaho
passed a law restricting the export of logs from state land. See Peter Tormey, Andrus
Signs Log Export Bill, UPI, Apr. 10, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni
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states or by the federal government. Federal law already prohibits the
export of unfinished logs from national forests."25 The amount of timber

affected by these state export ban proposals is staggering. The Washington Department of Natural Resources alone manages 2.1 million acres of
forest land. 128 In 1989, approximately 2seventy percent of the logs har1
vested from state forests was exported. 7
128
Oregon, Montana, Idaho, and California each had log export bans
until 1985, when the holding in South-Central Timber Development,
Inc. v. Wunnicke1 21 rendered unenforceable such bans as violative of the
Commerce Clause.1

30

The call for export bans, however, recently has

been renewed.
In 1990, Congress passed the Mini-Trade Bill, which allowed states
to prohibit the export of state timber.13 Nonetheless, the issue of foreign
depletion of United States natural resources remains unresolved because
the congressional legislation applies only to lumber; it does not address
other natural resources such as minerals, fisheries, gas, and oil. State
legislation protecting these natural, resources may arise in the future if
market forces militate for their export. Therefore, the question remains
unanswered whether, under the foreign branch of the Commerce Clause,
a state can ban the international export of state-owned natural resources.
III.

THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

A.

Underlying Values

The Commerce Clause provides, "[tihe Congress shall have Power...

To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
File.
125. See Act of Nov. 27, 1979, Pub. L. 96-126, Tit. III, § 301, 93 Stat. 954, 979;
Customs and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-382, tit. IV, § 489, 104 Stat. 629, 715
(1990); see also McDermott, supra note 32, at J8.
126. McDermott, supra note 32, at J2
127. Id. at J5
128. Jim Simon, Gardner,Boyle Take New Stands on Timber, The Seattle Times,
May 1, 1990, at El.
129. 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
130. See 467 U.S. at 100; see also JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

284-86 (1986) (discussing South Central Timber, and concluding "[i]f the local measure
I ..attempts to afford residents an economic advantage at the expense of a free-flowing
national market, the countervailing national interest will override.").
131. Customs and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-382, tit. IV, § 491, 104 Stat.

629, 719 (1990); see also Mini-Trade Bill Provision Prompts Reduction in Private Log
Exports, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1828 (Dec. 5, 1990).
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States, and with the Indian Tribes."18 This amorphous grant of power
has given birth to a sprawling jurisprudence. Given this express grant of
power to regulate commerce, Congress possesses authority to enact legislation affecting interstate commerce. 33 This authority includes the
power to approve state legislation affecting interstate commerce.13 When
federal and state legislation conflict, the federal law controls."" Beyond
this power, however, the boundaries of congressional power, and the extent to which state regulation may exist, when Congress is silent, or
when there is no "articulated congressional judgment," are not directly
inferable from the text of the clause. 38OThe inquiry of this Note implicates this so-called dormant commerce clause.' The dormant, or negative, Commerce Clause refers to state regulation of interstate commerce
in the face of congressional silence.'
Therefore, the question of how
much power to regulate interstate commerce the states retained under
the Constitution, and in the absence of controlling congressional legislation, remains unanswered.
Some scholars have argued that the framers' intent in drafting the
Commerce Clause was the creation of a common national market.' 39 The
Supreme Court initially responded by striking down laws that create
trade barriers between the states.' 40 From this action, scholars have in-

132. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
133. See White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 213. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 403 (2d ed. 1988) ("Article 1,

section 8, is phrased as an affirmative grant of power to Congress.").
134. NOWAK ET AL., supra note 130, at 260.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 260-261.
137. Id. at 261. "When the Court seeks to decide the extent of permissible state
regulation in light of a 'dormant' commerce clause power, it is in effect attempting to
interpret the meaning of congressional silence when the Court intervenes in an area
where the primary power is that of Congress." Id.
138. See id. at 261 ("the text of the commerce clause provides no overt restraint of
state impingement of interstate commerce in the absence of congressional legislation.");
see also TRIBE, supra note 133, at 468-69 (1988).
Under the dormant Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court has extended the plenary
power of the clause to situations in which Congress has not yet enacted legislation, but
has the power to do so. See Stephanie Landry, Comment, State Immunity from the Dormant Commerce Clause: Extension of the Market-Participant Doctrine from State
Purchase and Sale of Goods and Services to Natural Resources, 25 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 515, 517 (1985).
139. See, e.g., Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63
N.Y.U.L. REV. 43, 45 (1988); see also NOWAK, supra note 130, at 262.
140. See NOWAK ET AL., supra note 130, at 262 (discussing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)).
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ferred that free trade is the implicit value driving the Commerce
Clause. "1 Some constitutional scholars, however, argue that the values
undergirding the Commerce Clause are not so clear. Julian Eule, for
example, questions the concept that the Commerce Clause implicitly advocates reliance on the private market as the most efficient means of allocating natural resources. " 2 Eule posits that current Commerce Clause
jurisprudence unnecessarily incorporates laissez-faire economics as a
substantive constitutional value. " 3 Another constitutional scholar, Dan
T. Coenen, also has reinterpreted the economic intent of the framers regarding the Commerce Clause.'4 4 He argues that the framers, as demonstrated by their adoption of a federalist system, meant to provide for the
possibility of "economic experimentation" by the states.' 45 The framers
anticipated "limited departures from orthodoxy in state choices about
distributing state resources."' 4 6
Commerce Clause jurisprudence reflects the development of constitutional law as a see-saw battle between federal power and state auton-,
omy.'1 7 Only occasionally do the "currents of constitutional doctrine"
run in the states' favor.' 48 In contemporary Commerce Clause analysis,
the courts employ a balancing test that accords heavier weight to the
national interest in unimpeded interstate commerce than the state interest in local autonomy. 4 9 In the past, however, courts have accorded
states more autonomy in the regulation of commerce.15 0 Historically, a
141.

RICHARD

A.

POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW

603-09 (3d ed.

1986).
142. Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J.
425, 429 (1982). Eule argues that "[t]he Framers did not explicitly protect free trade."

Id. at 429. "Our Constitution ...did not attempt to solve economic parochialism by an
express prohibition against interference with free trade .... The commerce clause does
not expressly prohibit the states from enacting protectionist economic legislation. It
merely gives Congress the power to rectify such excesses by superseding enactments." Id.
at 430.
143. Id. at 435.

144. Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-ParticipantExemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MIcH. L. REV. 395, 418-19 (1989).
145. Id. at 418.
146. Id. at 418-19.

147. See id. at 396.
148.

Id. at 396-97

149. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-28 (1978). According to Coenen, "the court has propounded two main rules. First, state laws that effect
(simple economic protectionism' are subject to a 'virtually per se rule of invalidity."
Coenen, supra note 144, at 399 (citing City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 624).
150. See, e.g. Arlene Warden, Comment, The Disposition of State-Owned Resources
Under the Commerce Clause, 2 Hous. L. REv. 533, 534 (1984).
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number of distinctions were used to validate state statutes that affected
interstate commerce.' 5 ' Courts have approved state statutes characterized
as the exercise of state police power rather than as state economic regulation. 15 21 In Cooley v. Board of Wardens,5 3 the Court distinguished
state statutes affecting national trade that were local in scope from those
that affected an interest requiring federal uniformity.15 Cooley also articulated the precept that concurrent state and federal legislation of the
same subject is permissible.' 55 The Court later developed a distinction
based on whether the state at issue had a "direct" or "indirect" effect on
interstate commerce distinction. 5 The extent of permissible concurrent
state regulation of interstate commerce traditionally within the ambit of
federal legislation has also fluctuated. The Court's early "origin-ofpower" theory created separate areas exclusively subject to either state or
federal regulation.' 57 Later, in Cooley states became free to regulate "as-

15i. Id.
152.

Id. at 534.

153. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). See New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 9
L. Ed. 648 (1837), wherein the Court upheld a New York statute that required every
shipmaster arriving in New York from any foreign nation or state of the United States to
submit passenger identification information. Id. at 130-32. The Court applied a "regula-

tion of commerce/state power" test and found that the statute at issue was a permissible
exercise of state police power. Id. at 132. To support its potentially broad definition of
state police power, the Court cited THE FEDERALIST, No. 45 (Madison): "'The powers
reserved to the several states, will extend to al the objects, which in the ordinary course
of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the internal order,
improvement and prosperity of the state'." Id. at 133. See also Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 13 L.Ed. 966 (1851), wherein the Court upheld a Pennsylvania law against Commerce Clause attack. The law required ships entering or leaving Philadelphia to engage a local pilot. Id. at 321. The Court applied a distinction
between subjects of commerce which required a nationally uniform rule and subjects of
commerce for which differential treatment is necessary to fulfill the needs of individual
states. Id. at 319. Despite existent congressional legislation by which "the power to regulate pilots was conferred on Congress by the Constitution," and recognition that "the
regulation of pilots ...has an intimate connection with, and an important relation to the
general subject of commerce with foreign nations and among the several [s]tates,..." Id.
at 317, the Court found that "the nature of the subject when examined, is such as to
leave no doubt of the superior fitness and propriety, not to say the absolute necessity, of
different systems of regulation, drawn from local knowledge and experience, and conformed to local wants." Id. at 320.
154. Id. at 319.
155. Id. at 319-20.
156. Warden, supra note 150, at 534-5 ("the Court labelled 'direct' those state actions whose burden on interstate commerce it considered invalid, and 'indirect' those it
found allowable.").
157. See NOWAK ET AL., supra note 130, at 264-5 (discussing Willson v. Black-Bird
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pects of interstate and foreign commerce which were so local in character
as to demand diverse treatment." 158 In the contemporary Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc.'59 balancing test, courts invalidate state regulations affecting interstate or foreign commerce if they are facially discriminatory or
16 0
overly burdensome to interstate commerce.
B.

The Commerce Clause and Natural Resources

Much Commerce Clause jurisprudence has developed around state attempts to regulate state-owned or privately owned natural resources. Although most of these cases have concerned regulation of interstate commerce," 1 their principles may be applicable to state regulation of natural
resources in foreign commerce as well. Currently, the Commerce Clause
case law provides no exception for state regulation of natural resources.' 6 2 In the past, however, under state autonomy theories, states
possessed more authority to regulate interstate and foreign commerce in
order to conserve raw materials found within their borders.' 63
Within the realm of state regulation of natural resources, the appropriate Commerce Clause analysis is a multi-factor balancing test to reconcile opposing federal and state interests. 6 4 Also notable is the truism
that "[jiudicial responses often lag behind emergence of new economic
and political pressures involving natural resources."' 6 5 Despite the monolithic and inflexible appearance of current Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court previously has vacillated regarding the degree of permissible state regulation or protectionism. For example, when large,
resource-dependent industries became relatively common, courts viewed
Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829)).
158. Warden, supra note 150, at 534.
159. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
160. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984)
(the interstate commerce clause applied to an Alaskan law restricting the foreign export
of unworked logs).
162. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1986); see also D. Lee Shields,
Note, Maine v. Taylor: Natural Resource Statutes Against the Commerce Clause, or
When is a Hughes Not a Hughes But a Pike?, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 291, 293 (1989).
163. Nowak et al., supra note 130, at 282-283. See also Hudson County Water Co.
v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908), wherein the Court upheld a state prohibition against
transporting water out of state.
164. See Note, Hughes v. Oklahoma and Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission:

The Commerce Clause and State Control of Natural Resources, 66 VA. L. REV. 1145,
1160-61 (1980) (suggesting the typical commerce clause analysis may have to be adapted
when applied in cases involving natural resource regulation).
165. Id. at 1161.
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protectionist state regulations as "conservation efforts involving proprietary actions and regulation of wholly intrastate activities." ' 6 Later, the
Clause to reduce the scope of state conCourt expanded the Commerce
67
1

trol over natural resources.

Geer v. Connecticut represents the early, definitive case involving state
control of natural resources."'6 In Geer, the Court upheld Connecticut's
regulation restricting the export of wild gamebirds. 6 9 In Geer, the Court
distinguished between internal and external commerce, and interstate
commerce, and concluded that the power of the state to regulate the killing and ownership of game birds in this case was internal commerce not
subject to the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.' The Geer holding
remained intact until 1979, when Hughes v. Oklahoma... overruled
it. 17 2 In Hughes, the Court struck down an Oklahoma statute that prohibited the export of free-swimming minnows taken from waters in
Oklahoma. 17 3 The Hughes majority adopted the rationale similar to Justice Field's dissent in Geer,174 which reasoned that when wild game is
reduced to a state of possession, it becomes an article of commerce indis166. Id. at 1161-62; see, e.g., McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 394-95 (1876)
(Court upheld a statute which discriminated against nonresidents in the distribution of
natural resources, when the resources had not yet entered the stream of interstate commerce and no fundamental rights had been implicated).
167. Note, supra note 164, at 1162.
168. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
169. Id. at 530; see also Carol A. Fortine, Note, The Commerce Clause and Federalism: Implicationsfor State Control of Natural Resources, 50 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
601, 607-08 (1982).
170. 161 U.S. at 530-32.

171. 441 U.S. 322 (1979). Hughes sets forth the test for statutes which directly impinge on interstate commerce, whereas Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970),
sets forth the test for state statutes that incidentally affect interstate commerce. The Pike
balancing test is as follows:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation
to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated
will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether
it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
397 U.S. at 142.
172. 441 U.S. at 326, 335.
173. Id. at 323-25. The Oklahoma statute did not prohibit the export of hatchery
raised minnows. Id. at 325.
174. 161 U.S. at 528 ("[w]hen any animal ... is lawfully killed for the purposes of
food or other uses of man, it becomes an article of commerce, and its use cannot be
limited to the citizens of one State to the exclusion of citizens of another State.").
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tinguishable from any other article of commerce. 17 5 The Court characterized the statute as a clear-cut case of discrimination against out-ofstate minnow wholesalers and retailers. 17 6 The Court found conservation
to be a legitimate state interest similar to the state's interest in protecting
in public health and safety. 1 7 In the Court's current Commerce Clause
balancing test, public health and safety is considered to be a legitimate
state interest which may justify state interference with interstate commerce.17 8 The Court struck down the Oklahoma statute, however, because the majority felt that equally effective, nondiscriminatory means
were available.1 7 1 Justice Rehnquist's dissent, on the other hand, argued
that no discrimination was present because the statute prohibited both
out-of-state and in-state minnow retailers from exporting minnows from
Oklahoma.18 0 Rehnquist also reasoned that the statute was a legitimate
exercise of state power for the legitimate purpose of conservation.' 1
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey8 2 is another pivotal Commerce
Clause case that involved state protectionism used to shield privately
owned in-state resources. In City of Philadelphia,the Court struck down
a New Jersey statute prohibiting the importation of out-of-state waste
for disposal in New Jersey landfills.1 3 The majority found the New
Jersey statute to be facially discriminatory and, therefore, clearly violative of the Commerce Clause.1 4 In a dissent similar to the one in
Hughes, Rehnquist advocated a more flexible and functional Commerce
Clause analysis that would allow a state to respond to pressing environmental concerns without running afoul of the Commerce Clause merely
because the state legislation also incidentally benefitted the state's
citizens.18 5
Rehnquist's dissenting opinions in Hughes and Philadelphialaid the

175.

441 U.S. at 335-36.

176. Id. at 336-37.
177. Id. at 337.
178. See Warden, supra note 150, at 537 & n.26 (citing, for example, Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); Huron Portland Cement v. City of
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); and South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell
Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938)).
179. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337-38.
180. Id. at 344.
181. Id. at 342-44.
182. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
183. Id. at 618-19, 629.
184. Id. at 627-28. At least one constitutional scholar has argued that City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey was wrongly decided because the costs of regulation were not
exported by the state, but remained within the state. See Collins, supra note 139, at 113.
185. City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 631-33.
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groundwork for the majority opinion in Maine v. Taylor.l"" Maine signals a potential withdrawal, based upon environmental considerations,
from the Court's previous strict Commerce Clause holdings. 187 In
Maine, the Court upheld a state statute which prohibited the importation of out-of-state baitfish.' 8 8 Stating that the limitation on state regulation of interstate commerce "is by no means absolute,"' 9 the Court reaffirmed that the states retain some authority under their police powers to
regulate matters of legitimate local concern, such as conservation. 90
C.

The Foreign Commerce Clause

In issues involving state regulation of foreign commerce, a higher degree of Commerce Clause scrutiny applies.1 9' Traditionally, the judiciary
has accorded Congress broad plenary authority over matters involving
foreign commerce, in part because foreign commerce issues implicate a
number of other issues concerning the division of the foreign affairs
power within the federal system.' 92 Congress' broad grant of authority
over foreign commerce is grounded in the text of the Constitution and
the intent of the Framers. The Commerce Clause itself grants Congress
the power to "lay and collect . . . Imposts and Excises,"' 9 3 and "To

regulate Commerce with foreign Nations."194 The Commerce Clause
also mandates that "Imports and Excises shall be uniform throughout
the United States."' 9 5 Article I, section 10 reflects the framer's general
intent that states not have an independent voice in foreign affairs. 9
Congressional primacy with respect to foreign commerce is also based
on functional imperatives, such as the necessity for a national, unified
186. 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
187. See Shields, supra note 162, at 292-93, 298-301.
188. 477 U.S. at 132-33, 151-52.
189. Id. at 138 (quoting Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36

(1980)).
190. Id. at 151. The Court agreed with the district court's conclusion that "Maine
has a legitimate interest in guarding against imperfectly understood environmental
risks," and rejected evidence that Maine's regulation was motivated by protectionism. Id.
at 148-51.
191. See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 100; see also
Warden, supra note 150, at 556.

192. See

NOWAK ET AL.,

supra note 130, at 125-26.

193. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
194. Id. § 8, cl. 3.
195. Id. § 8, cl. 1.
196. Id. § 10; see also NOWAK ET AL., supra note 130, at 125 ("no constitutional
recognition of any 'reserved powers' of the states to act in [foreign trade or foreign
relations]").
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policy in international trade matters.1 9 7 In 1979, the Court articulated
the "one voice" standard in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles."' s Yet, the precedent for federal uniformity in foreign commerce
stretches back to the 1824 case of Gibbons v. Ogden.199
The framers were intent on promoting the formation of a strong economic union.2"' Although interstate rivalry was the dominant concern,
the framers also perceived state protectionism aimed at foreign powers as
an evil to avoid.20 1 Modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence reflects this
fear. The antidiscrimination rule of courts' Commerce Clause analyses is
an anticipatory response to potential protectionism, 0 2 which holds that
state laws are presumptively invalid if they categorically discriminate
against foreign commerce by directly favoring local interests over their
immediate foreign competitors.20 a
A court also must inquire whether the state statute unconstitutionally
interferes with the foreign affairs power of the federal government.
States enjoy substantial leeway from the courts in the absence of a specific congressional mandate against state action in a particular area.20 4
Zschernig v. Miller, 0 5 however, may bar state statutes which trespass on
Congress' foreign affairs power, even when the federal government has
not specifically preempted state action.20 6 To be prohibited under

197. Grace A. Jubinsky, Note, State and Municipal Governments React Against
South African Apartheid: An Assessment of the Constitutionality of the Divestment
Campaign, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 543, 558-59 (1985).
198. 441 U.S. 434 (1979). When the Japan Line "one voice" criteria is not impaired, however, the heightened scrutiny inherent in the Foreign Commerce Clause
drops out and is replaced by the regular interstate commerce clause analysis. See Jubinsky, supra note 197, at 559.
199. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 11-14 (1824). The Court in Gibbons noted that "the
higher branches of commercial regulation must be exclusively committed to a single
hand." Id. at 14; see also South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82,
100 (1984) (the United States must "speak with one voice when regulating commercial
relations with foreign governments.") (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S.
276, 285 (1976).
200. See NoWAK ET AL., supra note 130, at 262; Collins, supra note 139, at 45.
201. See Collins, supra note 139, at 53.
202. See id. at 75.
203. Id. at 75 (the antidiscrimination rule "presumes the invalidity of state laws that
categorically discriminate against interstate or foreign commerce.").
204. Jubinsky, supra note 197, at 567.
205. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
206. In Zschernig, the Court invalidated an Oregon probate statute that conditioned
the right of foreigners to inherit property from Oregon citizens upon the existence of
reciprocal rights in the foreign state. Id. at 430-31, 440-41. Thus, from Zschernig, courts
have derived a preemption doctrine which states that "even when the federal government
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Zschernig, the state statute either must have more than an incidental or
indirect effect within the foreign state, or it must create a great potential
20 7
for disruption or embarrassment.
Notably, however, very few state statutes have been invalidated under

the Zschernig doctrine.20 8 In K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North
Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n,20 9 the New Jersey Supreme Court
rejected a Foreign Commerce Clause challenge to a New Jersey "Buy
American" statute21 0 that required the state government to purchase
materials from United States manufacturers whenever possible."1 l The
majority opinion relied on a market participant exemption to the Foreign
Commerce Clause.

IV.

21 2

THE MARKET PARTICIPANT EXEMPTION

"The Court has dealt firmly with state attempts to control commerce
involving privately owned natural resources. ' 213 The question remains,
however, whether in the absence of a congressional edict to the contrary,
a state, acting as a market participant, may regulate foreign commerce
involving state-owned natural resources."" The Court has not yet addressed the application of the market participant exemption to state re21 5
strictions directed against foreign interests.
Two primary, but somewhat contradictory, rationales underlie the
market participant exemption. 2 6 The "private actor" rationale, based
upon notions of equity and evenhandedness, posits that a state which
enters the market and assumes the risks of a private actor should be
permitted to reap any benefits which may accrue.21 7 One of the perceived
has not acted," state legislation may be preempted if it "has a direct impact upon foreign
relations and impairs the federal government's ability to act in that area." Id. at 440-41;

see also Jubinsky, supra note 197, at 569-71.
207. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434-35; see alsoJubinsky, supra note 197, at 570.
208. SeeJubinsky, supra note 197, at 571.
209.

381 A.2d 774 (N.J. 1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978).

210. 381 A.2d at 784, 789.
211. Id. at 776; see also Jubinsky, supra note 197, at 571.
212. See 381 A.2d at 787-88.
213. Fortine, supra note 169, at 606.
214. See Landry, supra note 138, at 516. The market participant rule has been described as meaning "[a]s a rule, when a state makes trades, it should be able to prefer
residents to nonresidents as its trading partners." Coenen, supra note 147, at 441.

215.

See Jubinsky, supra note 197, at 556.

216. Landry, supra 138, at 522-23.
217. See id. at 523-26. "[S]tate proprietary activities may be, and often are, burdened
with the same restrictions imposed on private market participants. Evenhandedness suggests that, when acting as proprietors, states should similarly share existing freedoms
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benefits of private action is the discretion to choose with whom to deal.218
The second rationale posits that allocation of state-owned resources is an
activity derived from a state's inherent sovereignty.2 1 This sovereignty
rationale may overlap somewhat with the private actor rationale, in that
sovereignty includes power to decide with whom, how, and for whose
benefit to deal.220 One scholar has described "five key justifications" underlying the market participant rule.22 ' He suggests that it is fair to allow a state to favor its citizens in the allocation of state-owned resources. 222 Additionally, the values implicit in federalism suggest the
necessity "to avoid interference with state autonomy" in the distribution
of state-owned natural resources. 22' Furthermore, preferences for local
interests are less threatening to the values underlying the Commerce
Clause than "those discriminatory regulations and taxes that engendered
recognition of the dormant commerce clause principle."'22'
The market participant exemption, however, is not without its limits.
The relevant cases suggest that states may only impose restrictions on the
initial distribution of state-owned resources. 225 According to one scholar,
"almost any downstream restraint on the retransfer of raw natural resources disposed of by the state should be impermissible. ' 22" In FosterFountain Packing Co. v. Haydel,227 the Court held that a state could
not regulate the sale of shrimp taken from state waters after the shrimp
were sold in interstate commerce. 228 In dicta, the Court suggested that it
might have been permissible for the state to have restricted the shrimp
from federal constraints, including the inherent limits of the Commerce Clause." Reeves,
Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 439 (1980) (citation omitted).

218. See Coenen, supra note 144, at 437.
219. See Landry, supra note 138, at 522, 526-31.
220.
221.
222.

See id. at 526.
Coenen, supra note 144, at 419-20.
Id. at 420.

223. Id.
224. Id. The fourth justification was that states should have more leeway "when
dealing in the market than when regulating others' efforts at free trade." Id. The final
justification was that the dormant commerce clause should be applied cautiously to market-participation cases. Id.
225. See Landry, supra note 138, at 531; see, e.g., South-Central Timber Dev., Inc.
v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 98-99 (1984).
226. Coenen, supra note 144, at 469. Coenen concedes, however, that "these principles ... may be difficult to apply in practice." Id.
227. 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
228. Id. at 13 ("by permitting its shrimp . . . to be shipped and sold in interstate
commerce, the State ... definitely terminates its control"); see also Landry, supra note
138, at 543-44 (noting that the South-Central Timber court alluded to this quote from
the Foster-Fountaincase).
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for intrastate consumption prior to its entrance into the stream of interstate commerce.

229

230
The market participant exemption fits into the Pike balancing test
as an independent justification for state regulation. 2 1 In other words,
once a court determines that a state is acting as a market participant, the
examination of the burden on interstate commerce becomes unnecessary.23 2 The focus is no longer on legitimate local benefits, such as public
health and safety, but on states' rights as either a state sovereign or private actor.2 3
In Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, the Court considered a Commerce Clause
challenge to a state's burden on interstate commerce through its direct
market participation.23 4 South Dakota had built a cement plant and,
during a period of regional cement shortages, began to accord preferential treatment under its contracts with South Dakota citizens.23 5 A Wyoming citizen who held a long-term contract with the South Dakota cement plant challenged South Dakota's in-state preference under the
Commerce Clause.23 ' The Reeves majority held that, despite the appearance of protectionism, penalizing South Dakota for its foresight and enterprise in constructing a cement plant would be improper. 237 The
Reeves holding implies that some form of loose, indirect state protectionism is permissible.2 38 Significantly, however, the Court did not interpret
South Dakota's preferences as protectionism.2 39 Instead, the Court characterized South Dakota's in-state preference as the permissible channelling of state resources to the citizens whose taxes made the benefits possible.240 The holding may be understood as suggesting that a state's
rational, long-term planning decision which favors residents in stateowned or state-nurtured resource distribution does not threaten the goals

229. Foster-Fountain,278 U.S. at 13; see also Landry, supra note 138, at 544.
230. See supra note 174.
231. See Landry, supra note 138, at 524-25. "... in White, the Court indicated that
it would not look to the burden on commerce once the state had successfully established
itself as a market participant." Id.
232. Id. at 525.
233. Id. at 525-26.
234. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
235.

Id. at 430-33.

236. Id. at 433.

237. See id. at 445-47.
238. See Fortine, supra note 169, at 610-11.
239. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 442.
240. Id.; see also Warden, supra note 150, at 543-44. South Dakota's action was not
characterized as protectionism, but as an "improvement of the quality of life" for its
citizens. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 443 n.16.
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of the Commerce Clause.24 1
The Reeves opinion "concedes the possibility of a natural resources
exception to the market participant rule, ' 242 but does not conclusively
address the issue because it concluded that cement is not a natural resource. 24 3 Unlike coal, timber, fisheries, or wild game, the Court characterized cement as the "end product of a complex process whereby a
'244
costly physical plant and human labor act on raw materials.
In South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, Alaska imposed an
2 45
in-state processing requirement on logs harvested from state forests.

The affected logs were being exported to Japan almost exclusively.246
The Court rejected Alaska's argument that as a participant in the timber
market, the state was permitted to sell timber on its own terms and
thereby promote the local log-processing industry.2 47 The Court also rejected Alaska's market participant exemption argument and, instead,
characterized the requirement as an impermissible "downstream regulation."2 8 The Court held that Alaska could not employ the market participant exemption beyond the stage at which the logs were sold. 249
Alaska could not impose an in-state processing requirement after the initial distribution of state-owned resources.2 5" The Court also held that
there was no implicit congressional approval of state policy to overcome
the invalidity of Alaska's in-state manufacturing requirement.2 5 ' Despite
this holding, some commentators have posited that South-Central Tim241.

See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 429-47.

242.

Fortine, supra note 169, at 610.

243. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 443.
244. Id. at 444. The Court also considered the fact that South Dakota did not have
unique access to the materials necessary to make cement. Unique access in a similar
scenario could be construed as hoarding. Id. at 444.
245. 467 U.S. 82, 84-85 (1984).
246. Id. at 85.
247. Id. at 95-96, 98-99; see also Warden, supra note 154, at 551-52. Despite
Alaska's ownership of the logs, Alaska's primary manufacturing requirement was protectionist in "purpose and [] practical consequence." Id. at 557.
248. South-Central Timber, 467 U.S. at 99.
249. Id. at 82, 97-99.
250. Id. at 95-99. The Court suggested, however, that state subsidies extending only

to in-state businesses would be constitutional, "because the purchaser would retain the
option of taking advantage of the subsidy by processing timber in the State, or forgoing
the benefits of the subsidy and exporting unprocessed timber." Id. at 95; see also Landry,
supra note 138, at 538.
251. South-Central Timber, 467 U.S. at 91-92. "The fact that the state policy in this
case appears to be consistent with federal policy-or even that state policy furthers the
goal we believe Congress had in mind-is an insufficient indicium of congressional intent." Id. at 92.
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ber suggests that the Court will apply the market participant exemption
foreign commerce, as long as downstream
in a similar scenario involving
252
restrictions are absent.
The Court distinguished South-Central Timber from Reeves on the
basis of three elements present in South Central but not present in
Reeves: natural resources, downstream restrictions on resale, and foreign
commerce. 2 53 Implicating all three of these elements, the Court found
254
that in Reeves, South Dakota acted as a private market participant,
whereas in South-Central Timber, Alaska imposed "downstream" restrictions for the "purpose of fostering local industry.12 5 5 Despite South
Dakota's superficial similarity to a private actor (it manufactured a
product, maintained employees, and assumed market risks, for example),
the question arises whether South Dakota's allocation decisions were determined solely by market forces? Would a private economic actor rationally decide to sell to state residents rather than to the highest bidder?
Regarding the natural resources distinction, the Court contrasted
South Dakota's cement, the end product of a complex manufacturing
process, with Alaska's vast timber holdings, which the Court characterized as a "windfall. ' 256 Windfall may have been a proper characterization in Alaska's case, but is it applicable to other timber-producing states
that invest heavily in tree farms and the reseeding of state forests and
have well-staffed and well-equipped forestry management services? Are
these trees not more similar to South Dakota's cement, the end result of
a complex manufacturing process? Is not the only difference that one
process is industrial and the other silvacultural? The same reasoning
could be applied to other natural resources that traditionally are perceived as windfalls, such as extensive state expenditures for fish hatcheries, for other aspects of aquaculture, and for game management? Protecting these resources should not be characterized as hoarding. 257 Current

252.

253.

See Warden, supra note 150, at 553-55.
South-Central Timber, 467 U.S. at 96.

254. Id. at 95-96.
255. Id. at 98.
256. Id. at 96.
257. The Court recognizes, under the article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause,
that state residents may have a greater claim than out-of-state residents to natural resources developed and maintained by the state. See Tribe, supra note 133, at 434, n.33.
See also Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission of Montana, 435 U.S. 371 (1978). "The
elk supply, which has been entrusted to the care of the State by the people of Montana,
is finite and must be carefully tended in order to be preserved. Appellants' interest in
sharing this limited resource on more equal terms with Montana residents simply does
not fall within the purview of the Privilege and Immunities Clause." Id. at 388.
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Commerce Clause jurisprudence seems mired in a period of United
States history during which windfall raw materials were abundant, as
they still are in Alaska.
The holding in White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers258 may
implicitly contradict the Court's invalidation of Alaska's downstream restrictions in South-Central Timber. In White, the Court approved an
arguably "downstream restraint" under the market participant exemption. 259 The White Court held that the executive order in this case,
which influences a "discrete, identifiable class of economic activity in
which the city is a major participant," 260 fell within the market participant exemption. More generally expressed, "the Commerce Clause does
not require the city to stop at the boundary of formal privity of
'261
contract.
Apparently, the only remaining valid distinction between Reeves and
South-Central Timber is the foreign commerce issue. But assuming that
the primary rationale behind the "one voice" standard is the fear of retaliation,2 82 is this distinction still valid? Japan's market is already
largely closed to United States manufacturers. 26 3 The fear of counterembargoes, therefore, is rendered virtually void. Thus, the Court should
question whether to invalidate automatically state legislation that protects state-owned and investment-heavy natural resources against foreign
acquisition.
Examination of an alternative analysis may be fruitful. In South-Central, 'the Court suggested that the use of subsidies for downstream instate processors might be constitutional, but struck down downstream requirements on foreign purchasers. 264 Yet, under this alternative in-state
subsidy scheme, the possibility of retaliation still exists.26 This may indicate that protectionist results should not invalidate per se state legislation. Daniel Coenen has suggested that the erratic voting pattern in market participant cases suggests the absence of a consistent, all-

258, 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
259. Coenen, supra note 144, at 463 & n.395 (the downstream restraint of "requiring private traders to prefer state residents in making otherwise private hiring
decisions.").
260. White, 460 US. at 211 n.7.

261. Id.
262. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 453 & n.18 ("[t]he
risk of retaliation ... under these circumstances is acute, and such retaliation of necessity
would be felt by the Nation as a whole.").
263. See supra text accompanying notes 62-88.
264. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 95, 99 (1984).
265. See, e.g., Fortine, supra note 169, at 617.
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encompassing theory underlying the application of the exemption. 266
Coenen offers a number of reasons why the Court should relax its Commerce Clause scrutiny. First, benefits subsist from meaningful and responsive local government, including increased participatory democracy
and greater sensitivity to local concerns.287 Second, ordinary political and
marketplace pressures are sufficiently efficient barriers to the excessive
promulgation of in-state preferences.2 Third, in contrast to present
Commerce Clause analysis, the significance of the state legislation's goal
should be accorded greater consideration.2"' Finally, "states have a
heightened claim to favor residents in the disposition of . . resources
because such resources are quintessentially part of the territory over
27 0
which the state is sovereign. 1
Other commentators have argued that in the absence of a clear federal
prohibition, states should have the flexibility to allocate their resources
freely.271 Unlike Japan Line,27 2 in which the state sought to regulate all
private and public trade through its state taxation scheme, the SouthCentral Timber scenario involves the limited reach of state proprietary
activities.17 3 Additionally, strict scrutiny of Foreign Commerce Clause
issues becomes less important because Congress has the constitutional
power to negate any state legislation of which it disapproves.274
V.

CONCLUSION

Invalidating environmentally motivated state legislation that implicitly
corresponds with federal policy merely because the state legislation is
seemingly protectionist seems counterproductive. 7 5 Laurence Tribe's

266.

Coenen, supra note 144, at 405.

267. Id. at 427. Additionally, the uniquely local nature of state management of stateowned resources is an inappropriate federal uniformity concern. Jubinsky, supra note

202, at 561.
268. Coenen, supra note 144, at 434-35.
269. Id. at 442.
270. Id. at 456.
271. Jubinsky, supra note 197, at 566.
272. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
273. See Jubinsky, supra note 197, at 559 ("State legislation governing the state's
proprietary decisions are confined to operate only upon the marketplace activities of the
state itself.").
274. See generally id. at 550. ". . . the 'subtle, complex [and] politically charged'
nature of most market participation questions rendered then more suitable for congressional, rather than judicial, resolution." Id.
275. In Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 442 (1979), the Court characterized South
Dakota's refusal to sell cement produced in a state-owned factory to non-South Dakota
buyers as protectionist "only in the sense that it limits benefits generated by a state
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analysis of Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp."7 6 reflects a recognition
of this counterproductivity. Tribe contends that Alexandria Scrap "suggests growing judicial solicitude for efforts by states to protect the environmental and other needs of their residents." 2 7 The argument has been
made that, if no significant federal interest is impaired, the Court should
apply the rational basis test to state legislation 78 implementing in-state
preferences in the distribution of resources. Others believe that protec-

tionist intent, not protectionist effect, should be the focus of foreign Commerce Clause inquiry.279 As the Court recently stated in Maine v. Taylor, "[the Commerce Clause] does not elevate free traie above all other
values.

' 280

The Maine Court also expressed the view that as long as a

state does not isolate itself economically, "it retains broad regulatory authority to protect . . . the integrity of its natural resources. ' 28 x
Powerful state sovereignty arguments also lend legitimacy to state attempts to conserve natural resources which impinge on foreign commerce: "a state's response to a foreign government's foray into its own
territory is not per se a veto or hindrance of national policy. 18 2 Within
the scheme of federalism, states exist for more than mere historical reasons. 28 3 Reeves and the Rehnquist dissent in Hughes both suggest that
state residents should be able to benefit from the natural advantages contained within a state's borders. 28 4 "It is questionable whether the com-

program to those who fund the state treasury and whom the state was created to serve."

Id.
276. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
277. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 337-38 (1978).
278. See Note, supra note 164, at 1164-65 ("The court should not focus on whether
the statute discriminates against interstate commerce or whether the benefits to the state
outweigh the federal interest. Such balancing provides little guidance . .
279. See Collins, supra note 139, at 117-124.
280. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986). State rules can be more responsive
to local environmental conditions and preferences. Note, supra note 164, at 1164.

281. Maine, 477 U.S. at 151.
282. Jubinsky, supra note 197, at 574 (quoting Reisman, Foreign Affairs and the
Several States: Outline of a Theory for Decision, 71 AM. SOCY' INT'L L. PROCS. 182,
198-99 (1977)).
283. See James Huffman, Governing America's Resources: Federalism in the
1980's, 12 ENVTL. L. 863, 871 (1982). One scholar has argued that state laws that
burden interstate commerce can be legitimized as fair charges for services provided by
state government. See Collins, supra note 142, at 69.
284. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1978). Rehnquist objected to the majority's overruling of Geer by defending it as "a shorthand way of describing of state's
substantial interest in preserving and regulating the exploitation of the fish and game and
other natural resources within its boundaries for the benefit of its citizens." Id., at 342.
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 442 U.S. 429 (1979). The Court rejected the plaintiff's argument
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merce clause was intended to preserve the integrity of interstate commerce at the cost of denying individuals the benefits of living in a certain
geographical area." 2 5
Maine v. Taylor creates the possibility of a special Commerce Clause
dispensation for state environmental regulations.28 8 Maine implies that
when the legitimate local purpose is environmental, a lighter burden of
proof is required. That is, the mere possibility of environmental harm is
sufficient to satisfy the burden of proof.2 7 This relaxed burden of proof
is a response to the unique threat presented by environmental degradation. "[T]he constitutional principles underlying the commerce clause
cannot be read as requiring the State of Maine to sit idly by and wait
until potentially irreversible environmental damage has occurred . . .
before it acts to avoid such consequences." ' Given the overriding significance of long-term, irreversible environmental damage, the Maine anal-

ysis should be applicable in the case of the Foreign Commerce Clause as
well.
In the present era, which is characterized by a growing worldwide
shortage of raw materials, natural resources assume special significance.
In the forum of Commerce Clause litigation, the federal interests in a
national market and free trade periodically clash with the states' interest
in the conservation of natural resources.28 9 Although the federal interest
almost always prevails, the distinction between impermissible protectionism and the legitimate exercise of state power is ill-defined. 9 0 Perhaps
the time is ripe for the emergence of a new paradigm. The seemingly

that South Dakota's refusal to sell cement produced in a state-owned factory to nonSouth Dakota buyers was protectionist. The Court characterized South Dakota's actions
as protectionist "only in the sense that it limits benefits generated by a state program to
those who fund the state treasury and whom the state was created to serve." Id. at 442.
See also Tribe, supra note 136. "Moreover, White, Reeves and Alexandria Scrap all
involved government expenditures of public revenues to create commerce which generated
benefits that those governments wished to keep within their communities." Id. at 433.
"The market participation exemption ... encourages states and cities to improve the
lives of their citizens by allowing the benefits they generate to be contained within their
borders." Id. at 434.
285. Note, supra note 164, at 1166.
286. See Shields, supra note 162, at 299-302.
287. See id. at 300. "Maine has a legitimate interest in guarding against imperfectly
understood environmental risks, despite the possibility that they may ultimately prove to
be negligible." Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 (1986).
288. Maine, 477 U.S. at 148 (quoting the district court opinion, United States v.
Taylor, 585 F. Supp. 393, 397 (1984)).

289. See Shields, supra note 162, at 292-93.
290. See Collins, supra note 139, at 74.
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limitless supply of natural resources of the 1700s that shaped the framers' world view has given way to worldwide scarcity. Ever since Cooley
ushered in the balancing test in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, 9 1
states have advocated the advantages of increased state control over natural resources to promote the health and safety of state citizens. 292 Perhaps the seriousness of natural resource depletion and the growing
awareness of the complexity of the world's ecosystems suggest that states
should be free to test creative solutions to environmental degradation,
even if it results in some state interference with foreign commerce.
David E. Dreijke

291.

See Huffman, supra note 283, at 872-73.

292. Id.

